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11 Introduction
This paper takes a noncooperative approach to modelling voting in the EU
Council of Ministers using the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of majoritarian
bargaining. In this model, the voters bargain over the division of a …xed
budget by making and voting on proposals, and a voter’s power can be mea-
sured by its expected equilibrium payo¤.1 The equilibrium of the bargaining
game is analyzed for the Council of Ministers in 1958, 1973 and 1981. Com-
paring the countries’ expected payo¤s before and after each enlargement, it
is observed that at least one existing member is better-o¤ in each of the two
enlargements even under the extreme assumption that the total pie remains
constant after enlargement.
The possibility that adding new members to a voting body may increase
the power of an existing member even if the number of votes of all existing
members and the decision rule remain constant was …rst raised by Brams
and A¤uso (1976). In later papers (Brams and A¤uso, 1985a, 1985b) they
showed that the paradox has theoretically occurred in the EEC (now EU)
Council of Ministers. Brams and A¤uso based their analysis on the ap-
plication of Shapley and Banzhaf power indices to weighted voting games.
Because power indices do not have clear strategic foundations, one may be
tempted to dismiss the paradox as a pathological feature of power indices.
The contribution of this paper is to show that the paradox is predicted for
past EEC enlargements using the leading model of strategic bargaining.
Not only can the paradox occur as an equilibrium feature of a bargaining
game, but it can be even more extreme than suggested by power indices.
The countries that gain with the 1981 enlargement had a majority in the
1973 Council. Thus, if quali…ed majority voting had been used to decide
on enlargement, the new member would have been admitted even if the
countries were bargaining over a …xed pie.
1This concept of power is sometimes labelled P-power (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998).
22 The noncooperative bargaining procedure
There is a budget of size 1 to be divided by majority rule between  players.
Player  has  votes and  votes are needed to achieve a majority. We
will denote a weighted majority game by [;1]. A group of players
 with
P
2  ¸  is called a winning coalition; a winning coalition such
that
P
2nfg    for all  is called a minimal winning coalition. A player
that does not belong to any minimal winning coalition is a dummy player.
A player that belongs to all minimal winning coalitions is a veto player.
Bargaining proceeds as follows: At every round  = 12 Nature ran-
domly selects a proposer (each player is selected with probability 1
). This
player proposes a distribution of the budget (1) with  ¸ 0 for all 
and
P
2  = 1. The proposal is voted upon immediately (closed rule). If
the sum of votes in favor of the proposal is at least  the proposal is imple-
mented and the game ends; otherwise the game proceeds to the next period
in which Nature selects a new proposer (again each player is selected with
probability 1
). Players are risk neutral and do not discount future payo¤s.




th round strategy of player , prescribes
1. A proposal .
2. A response function assigning ”yes” or ”no” to all possible proposals
by the other players.
The solution concept is stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE).
Stationarity requires that players follow the same (possibly mixed) strategy
at every round  regardless of past o¤ers and responses to past o¤ers. Banks
and Duggan (2000) show that an SSPE always exists in this type of bar-
gaining model. Eraslan and McLennan (2006) show that all SSPE lead to
the same expected equilibrium payo¤s.
2.1 Three voting bodies
Table 1, adapted from Felsenthal and Machover (2001), shows the weighted
majority voting games associated to the original European Community in
3Country 1958 1973 1981
Germany 4 10 10
Italy 4 10 10
France 4 10 10
Netherlands 2 5 5
Belgium 2 5 5
Luxemburg 1 2 2
UK - 10 10
Denmark - 3 3
Ireland - 3 3
Greece - - 5
Quota 12 41 45
Total votes 17 58 63
Quota (%) 70.59 70.69 71.43
Table 1: Weights and quota in the Council of Ministers
1958, 1973 and 1981.
We now calculate the equilibrium payo¤s of the bargaining game for
each of these voting bodies. Since equilibrium payo¤s are unique, it will
su¢ce to …nd one equilibrium strategy combination (all other equilibrium
combinations lead to the same payo¤s). From now on we restrict ourselves
to symmetric strategies: all players of the same type follow the same strategy
and are treated symmetrically by other players’ strategies.
In a stationary equilibrium, a player’s expected payo¤ given that a pro-
posal is rejected (the continuation value) equals his expected equilibrium
payo¤ at the beginning of the game. It is optimal for each player to accept
any o¤er that gives him at least his continuation value as a responder. As
a proposer, player  looks for the cheapest group of players controlling at
least  ¡  votes, and makes a proposal allocating to these players their
continuation values and keeping the remainder for himself. Following com-
mon practice, we will refer to the proposer together with the players that
are o¤ered their continuation values as the ”proposed coalition”, and, if the
4proposal is passed, as the ”coalition that forms”.
Two conditions must be satis…ed in equilibrium: strategies must be op-
timal given expected payo¤s, and expected payo¤s must be consistent with
the strategies. To …nd the equilibrium expected payo¤s, we will make hy-
potheses about them (e.g., the expected payo¤ of a player with 4 votes is
twice the expected payo¤ of a player with 2 votes) and then construct strate-
gies that are optimal given the hypotheses and that lead to payo¤s satisfying
the hypotheses.
2.2 Equilibrium of game [12;4,4,4,2,2,1]
There are four minimal winning coalitions in this game: one coalition of
type [444] and three coalitions of type [4422]. The player with 1 vote does
not belong to any minimal winning coalition.
Denote expected equilibrium payo¤s by  (for a player with 4 votes), 
(for a player with 2 votes) and  (for the player with 1 vote).
Suppose equilibrium payo¤s are such that  = 2. Under this hypothe-
sis, a player with 4 votes is indi¤erent between paying 2 and forming the
coalition of type [444] and paying  + 2 and forming one of the two coali-
tions of type [4422] to which he belongs. Denote by  the probability that
a given player with 4 votes proposes [444] (conditional on being proposer).
The probability of proposing each of the two coalitions of type [4422] is then
1¡
2 . A player with 2 votes needs to buy 10 votes, and the best way to do
this is to form a coalition of type [4422] (a coalition of type [4442] would
be too expensive under the hypothesis  = 2). There are three such coali-
tions, each proposed with probability 1
3. The player with 1 vote needs to
buy 11 votes, and is indi¤erent between forming coalition [4441] and forming
a coalition of type [44221]. Denote the probability of proposing [4441] by ;
then each of the three [44221] coalitions is proposed with probability
1¡
3 .
The following table shows the probability that each player type proposes
each of the coalition types, with the number of available coalitions for that
player type in parentheses. Because the proposer must be included in the
coalition, the number of available coalitions of each type may depend on the
5proposer’s type.
Coalition type
[444] [4422] [4441] [44221]
[4]  (1) 1 ¡  (2) - -
Player type [2] - 1 (3) - -
[1] - -  (1) 1 ¡  (3)
Expected equilibrium payo¤s are determined by these strategies. Con-
sider a player with 4 votes. With probability 1
6 he is selected to be proposer
and obtains a payo¤ of 1 ¡ 2 (this is the proposer’s payo¤ regardless of
whether he proposes [444] or [4422] because  = 2). With probability 2
6,
one of the two other players with 4 votes is selected, and the player receives
a proposal with probability  + 1¡
2 . With probability 2
6 one of the two
players with 2 votes is selected and proposes each coalition of type [4422]
with probability 1
3. A given player with 4 votes belongs to two of these three
coalitions, and thus receives a proposal with probability 2
3. With probability
1
6 the player with 1 vote is selected and proposes to the player with 4 votes
with probability  + 2
3 (1 ¡ ). The equations for  and  can be derived
analogously. Together with the postulated condition  = 2, we have the






























(1 ¡ 2 ¡ ) +
3
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The solution to this system of equations is 0 ·  · 1,  =
12¡5
15 ,  = 10
42,
 = 5
42,  = 2
42. Notice that even though Luxemburg is a dummy player
its expected equilibrium payo¤ is positive because it is allowed to make
proposals.
62.3 Equilibrium of game [41;10,10,10,10,5,5,3,3,2]
The 1973 enlargement changed the voting game from [12;444221] to
[41;1010101055332]. Three new members were added and the weights
of all pre-existing members were multiplied by 2.5, with the exception of the
smallest member (Luxemburg), whose votes were multiplied by 2. The per-
centage of the total votes required to pass a proposal remained essentially
constant (keeping it exactly constant would lead to a quota of 40.94, which
has the same implications as a quota of 41). If Luxemburg’s votes had been
multiplied by 2.5, any incumbent being better-o¤ would be an instance of the
paradox of new members. The fact that Luxemburg’s votes were multiplied
by only 2 seems to make it more di¢cult for Luxemburg to be better-o¤
after the enlargement.2 However, we will see that Luxemburg’s expected
equilibrium payo¤ increases after the enlargement in the Baron-Ferejohn
model.
There are 25 minimal winning coalitions of six possible types: [10 10 10
10 5], [10 10 10 10 3], [10 10 10 10 2], [10 10 10 5 5 3], [10 10 10 5 5 2] and
[10 10 10 5 3 3].
Expected equilibrium payo¤s will be denoted by  (players with 10
votes),  (players with 5 votes),  (players with 3 votes) and  (player
with 2 votes). Postulate an equilibrium with       ,  = 2 and
 + = 2. Then the following types of minimal winning coalitions are the
cheapest: [10 10 10 10 2], [10 10 10 5 5 2], [10 10 10 5 3 3]. All other winning
coalitions would be too expensive to form. Unlike in the previous example,
each player belongs to at least one of the cheapest coalitions.
2In fact, [41;1010101055332] and [41;1010101055331] have the same
winning coalitions, thus Luxemburg’s votes might as well have remained constant.
7Equilibrium strategies are summarized by the following table
Coalition type
[10 10 10 10 2] [10 10 10 5 5 2] [10 10 10 5 3 3 ]
[10]  (1)  (3) 1 ¡  ¡  (6)
Player type [5] -  (4) 1 ¡  (4)
[3] - - 1 (8)
[2]  (1) 1 ¡  (4) -
The four equations for expected payo¤s together with the two conditions























































(1 ¡ 3 ¡  ¡ ) +
4
9
(1 ¡  ¡ ) +
2
9







(1 ¡ 4) +
4
9





2 =  + 
Again there are in…nitely many solutions for the equilibrium strategies,
but a unique solution for , ,  and . The (unique) equilibrium expected
payo¤s are  = 67¡
p
73
368 ¼ 0159,  = 67¡
p
73







1472 ¼ 0063. There are many possible values for the strategies.
Setting  = 0 and  = 1 we obtain  = 11¡
p
73




Because  +  · 1, all probabilities are between 0 and 1.
Luxemburg has stopped being a dummy player, and this increases its
equilibrium payo¤s. This result is natural but not obvious because Lux-
emburg was already earning a positive payo¤ as a proposer in the previous
game and it is now less likely to propose.
Perhaps surprisingly, expected payo¤s for countries with 2, 3 and 5 votes
do not di¤er much. Intuition dictates that a country with 5 votes and a com-
bination of two countries with 3 and 2 votes respectively are interchangeable
8and ought to have the same expected payo¤. However, the set of minimal
winning coalitions is not rich enough for this to be feasible. Minimal winning
coalitions including a player with 5 votes already include the player with 2
votes (coalitions of type [10 10 10 5 5 2]) or both of the players with 3 votes
(coalitions of type [10 10 10 5 3 3]) or are too expensive to be relevant (in
[10 10 10 10 5] and [10 10 10 5 5 3] a player with 5 votes could be replaced
by a combination of two players, but then the player with 2 votes would be
super‡uous).
2.4 Equilibrium of the game [45;10 10 10 10 5 5 5 3 3 2]
In 1981 Greece entered the European Community with 5 votes and the
quota was raised to 45. The voting weights of all other countries were left
unchanged, and the percentage of votes required to achieve a majority was
essentially unchanged since 41
58 £ 63 ¼ 4453.
This new game is radically di¤erent to the previous one and easier to
analyze. First, a player with 3 votes and a player with 2 votes have be-
come interchangeable. The new voting game is equivalent to the game
[18;4,4,4,4,2,2,2,1,1,1]. Second, the possibility of replacing a player with
5 votes by a combination of players with 3 and 2 votes (or 3 and 3 votes)
has become relevant.
As before, we denote expected payo¤s by ,  and . Since players with
3 votes and players with 2 votes have become interchangeable, they both
have the same expected payo¤ . To simplify the search for equilibrium,
we limit ourselves to strategies in which the players with 3 votes and the
player with 2 votes follow the same strategy and are treated symmetrically
by other players.
If we postulate  = 2 and  = 2, these two equations together with
4+3 +3 = 1 uniquely determine expected payo¤s. The unique solution
is  = 016,  = 008,  = 004. All we need is to verify that there are
equilibrium strategies supporting those payo¤s.
9Under the hypotheses  = 2 and  = 2, all minimal winning coalitions
are equally cheap. There are 46 minimal winning coalitions3 of 6 possible
types (4 types if we take into account that players with 2 and 3 votes are
interchangeable): [10 10 10 10 5], [10 10 10 10 3 3], [10 10 10 10 3 2], [10
10 10 5 5 5], [10 10 10 5 5 3 3], [10 10 10 5 5 3 2]. The table below pools
players with 2 and 3 votes.
[10 10 10 10 5]
[10 10 10 10 3 3]
[10 10 10 10 3 2]
[10 10 10 5 5 5]
[10 10 10 5 5 3 3]
[10 10 10 5 5 3 2]
[10]  (3)  (3)  (3) 1 ¡  ¡  ¡  (27)
[5]  (1) -  (4) 1 ¡  ¡  (24)
[3/2] -  (2) ¡ 1 ¡  (24)
We can simplify the search further by looking for equilibria with  =
 =  =  = 0. The strategy table becomes
[10 10 10 10 5]
[10 10 10 10 3 3]
[10 10 10 10 3 2]
[10 10 10 5 5 5]
[10 10 10 5 5 3 3]
[10 10 10 5 5 3 2]
[10]  (3) ¡ ¡ 1 ¡  (27)
[5] ¡ -  (4) 1 ¡  (24)
[3/2] - ¡ ¡ 1 (24)



































































 = 2 = 4
The solution to this system is  = 3
4,  = 5
6,  = 4
25,  = 2
25,  = 1
25.
The values of  and  all increase slightly compared with the 1973 values.
This means that if enlargement were put to the vote under weighted majority
it would be approved!
3The number of minimal winning coalitions can be checked using the Powerslave soft-
ware (Pajala, 2002).
10Expected equilibrium payo¤s are summarized in the following table
1958 1973 1981
Germany 0.238 0.159 0.160
Italy 0.238 0.159 0.160
France 0.238 0.159 0.160
Netherlands 0.119 0.079 0.080
Belgium 0.119 0.079 0.080
Luxemburg 0.048 0.063 0.040
UK - 0.159 0.160
Denmark - 0.071 0.040
Ireland - 0.071 0.040
Greece - - 0.080
Table 2. Expected equilibrium payo¤s
For comparison, the Shapley value and the Banzhaf index4 are
Shapley value
Country 1958 1973 1981
Germany 0.233 0.179 0.174
Italy 0.233 0.179 0.174
France 0.233 0.179 0.174
Netherlands 0.150 0.081 0.071
Belgium 0.150 0.081 0.071
Luxemburg 0 0.001 0.030
UK - 0.179 0.174
Denmark - 0.057 0.030
Ireland - 0.057 0.030













Power indices like the Shapley value and the Banzhaf index agree with
the noncooperative model in that the 1973 enlargement favored Luxemburg,
and the 1981 enlargement hurt Denmark and Ireland the most. An impor-
tant di¤erence is that Luxemburg gains in both enlargements according to
4The table reports the normalized Banzhaf index; the e¤ects of enlargement according
to the absolute Banzhaf index are qualitatively similar.
11the power indices, and loses in the second enlargement according to the non-
cooperative bargaining model. Also, if countries wanted to maximize their
Shapley or Banzhaf power indices and enlargement was subject to weighted
majority voting, it would have been rejected.
3 Concluding remarks
The paradox of new members in the EU is not exclusive to power indices,
but can occur in a noncooperative model of bargaining over a …xed pie. In
fact, it is stronger in the noncooperative model since enlargement can bene…t
a majority of existing members.
It is di¢cult to know the real e¤ects of enlargement. Power indices and
the legislative bargaining model agree in that the paradox is possible, but
di¤er on which country bene…ts. The Banzhaf index assumes yes/no vot-
ing over exogenous proposals with each country being equally likely to vote
yes or no and countries voting independently. The Shapley value may be
interpreted as a measure of expected payo¤s in bargaining over a …xed pie,
though it is di¢cult to …nd a compelling bargaining model that yields the
Shapley value for weighted majority games.5 It is clear that neither yes/no
voting with a random agenda and random preferences nor pure bargaining
over a private good are accurate models of voting in the Council of Ministers.
However, the fact that very di¤erent assumptions all lead to the paradox
of new members seems to indicate that this is a potentially important phe-
nomenon. The paradox has also been observed experimentally under two
di¤erent bargaining procedures by Montero, Sefton and Zhang (2008) and
Drouvelis, Montero and Sefton (2010).
5Existing models either assume that all proposals must be passed by unanimity or their
results are restricted to a domain that does not include weighted majority games; see the
discussion in Drouvelis, Montero and Sefton (2010).
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